Challenges to Dualism
In light of the recent revival of non-reductive ontologies this conference aims to reflect critically on some recent versions of (substance) dualism. Its main focus lies on the attempt to formulate a version of dualism that is compatible with the scientific insight that human persons are a late product of natural evolution and therefore dependent on being embodied.
Indeed, one’s perception of oneself as embodied appears to be a necessary precondition for self-expression and communication. Human persons are literally created, not by biological processes but rather by means of social interaction and encounters, which presuppose an embodied existence. Even biblical eschatology promises a new, yet unknown mode of embodiment for the life hereafter.
But in what sense are these insights compatible with substance dualism?
This conference will target the following questions (among others):
- Does the presumption of the non-identity of persons and living bodies (substance-dualism) necessarily involve persons being something immaterial (immaterialism)? If not, what sort/kind of thing are (human) persons then?
- Does the non-identity of persons and living bodies imply their separability? If not, how can their relationship be positively characterized?
- If (a) subjects/persons are products of natural evolution, (b) there are no instantiation of mental properties without their physical correlates, and (c) supernatural explanations are ruled out, does this imply that we must revise the concept of emergence to allow for the non-supervenience of the mental on the physical?
This conference will bring together eminent scholars in the fields of contemporary (analytic) metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of religion, in order to grapple with these and other related questions.
Sponsored by: